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ABSTRACT: In its judgment of 6 March 2018, in Achmea (case C-284/16 [GC]), the CJEU for the first 
time ruled on the validity, in light of EU law, of an international agreement between Member 
States. The judgment raises several important legal questions. This Insight concentrates exclusively 
on those related to the concept of “tribunal” within the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU and the conse-
quences of the declaration of invalidity contained therein. 
 
KEYWORDS: autonomy of EU law – interpretative preliminary ruling – declaration of invalidity – na-
tional tribunal under Art. 267 TFEU – BIT – arbitration clause. 
 
I. The facts of the case 
In the judgment delivered on 6 March 2018, in Achmea,1 the CJEU ruled on the compatibil-
ity with Arts 18, 267, 344 TFEU of the arbitration clause contained in Art. 8 of the Bilateral 
 
* Assistant Professor of International Law, Senior Lecturer in European Union Law, Sapienza Univer-
sity of Rome, emanuele.cimiotta@uniroma1.it. 
1 Court of Justice, judgment of 6 March 2018, case C-284/16, Achmea BV [GC]. For some initial com-
ments, see B. HESS, A European Law Reading of Achmea, in Conflict of Laws, 8 March 2018, 
www.conflictoflaws.net; S. HINDELANG, The Limited Immediate Effects of CJEU’s Achmea Judgment, in Verfas-
sungsblog, 9 March 2018, www.verfassungsblog.de; V.D. THYM, The CJEU Ruling in Achmea: Death Sentence 
for Autonomous Investment Protection Tribunals, in EU Law Analysis, 9 March 2018, 
www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.it; C. ECKES, Don’t Lead with Your Chin! If Member States Continue with the Rati-
fication of CETA, They Violate European Union Law, in European Law Blog, 13 March 2018, 
www.europeanlawblog.eu; P. NIEMELÄ, Achmea – A Perspective from International (Investment) Law, in Euro-
pean Law Blog, 15 March 2018, www.europeanlawblog.eu; A. DIMOPOULOS, Achmea: The Principle of Auton-
omy and Its Implications for Intra and Extra-EU BITs, in EJIL Talk!, 27 March 2018, www.ejiltalk.org; F. MUNARI, 
C. CELLERINO, EU Law is Alive and Healthy: The Achmea Case and a Happy Good-bye to Intra-EU Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties, in SIDIBlog, 17 April 2018, www.sidiblog.org; S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, It is Not Just About Inves-
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Investment Treaty (BIT) concluded between the Netherlands and (then) Czechoslovakia in 
1991, still applicable to Slovakia after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993. The clause 
enabled an investor from a State Party to bring proceedings before an ad hoc arbitral tri-
bunal in the event of a dispute concerning investments in the other State Party. In sharp 
contrast to what contended by the referring judge2 and suggested by the Advocate Gen-
eral, in its Opinion of 19 September 2017,3 the Court issued a declaration of invalidity, due 
to the alleged adverse effect of the arbitration clause on the autonomy of EU law.4 
Here are the main facts of the case. In 2006, Slovakia partly reversed the liberaliza-
tion of its health insurance market and prohibited the distribution of profits generated 
by private related activities. In 2008, Achmea (a company belonging to a Dutch insur-
ance group and established in Slovakia since 2004 to provide sickness insurance ser-
vices in that State) instituted arbitration proceedings against Slovakia pursuant to the 
BIT, arguing that such prohibition violated the agreement and caused financial damage 
to it. In 2012, the arbitral tribunal found that Slovakia had breached the BIT, and or-
dered it to pay compensation in favor of Achmea. Subsequently, Slovakia brought an 
action before the German courts (the arbitration took place in Germany, hence German 
courts had jurisdiction to review its lawfulness), seeking annulment of the arbitral 
award on account of the inconsistency of the arbitration clause with Arts 18, 267, 344 
TFEU. The German Federal Court of Justice, having heard the case on appeal, requested 
the CJEU to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of those EU Treaty provisions, 
in view of determining whether the arbitration clause is compatible with them. 
The importance of the judgment is witnessed by the wide participation in the pro-
ceedings before the Court. Sixteen Member States submitted written observations ei-
ther in support or opposition to the validity of the clause at issue. The legality of clauses 
of similar kind contained in nearly two hundred BITs currently in force between Mem-
ber States could have also been affected.5 Thus, the Achmea judgment is expected to 
have a systematic and direct influence on intra-EU investment law and procedure: a 
crucial area for economic and financial growth within the EU. 
 
tor-State Arbitration. A Look at Case C-284/16, Slovak Republic v. Achmea BV, in European Papers – Europe-
an Forum, www.europeanpapers.eu, forthcoming. 
2 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 14-23. 
3 Opinion of AG Wathelet delivered on 19 September 2017, case C-284/11, Achmea BV. 
4 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 59-60. 
5 In the operative part of its ruling, the Court affirmed: “[a]rticles 267 and 344 TFEU must be interpreted 
as precluding a provision in an international agreement concluded between Member States, such as Article 8 
of the Agreement on encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic” (ibid., para. 62, emphasis added). 
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II. The judgment and its reasoning 
For the first time the Court was asked to interpret EU law so as to ascertain the legality 
of an international agreement between Member States. Not for nothing has the refer-
ring judge decided to address the Court notwithstanding it did not share Slovakia’s 
doubts regarding the compatibility of the BIT with the TFEU.6 As widely known, over 
time the interpretative preliminary ruling procedure set forth in Art. 267 TFEU has been 
used de facto in order to indirectly review the validity of national laws in force within 
single Member States.7 The Achmea judgment extends this practice to international 
agreements concluded between Member States. 
It is settled case-law of the CJEU that an international agreement between the EU 
(or its Member States) and third parties cannot affect the allocation of powers envis-
aged by the EU Treaties or, consequently, the autonomy of the EU legal order.8 In Ach-
mea, for the very first time, the Court opened up this principle to include inter se 
agreements between Member States. 
The concept of “tribunal” for the purposes of Art. 267 TFEU was also at stake. In the 
Court’s view, the ad hoc arbitral tribunal created in accordance with the BIT cannot be 
classified as such, since it is not part of the Dutch or Slovak judicial system. It was precisely 
the exceptional nature of its jurisdiction, compared with that of the ordinary court system 
of the two Member States, that was one of the principal reasons for the existence of Art. 8 
BIT. As a result, according to the Court, the tribunal has no power to make a reference for 
a preliminary ruling,9 despite it might be called on to interpret and apply EU law.10 
Lastly, the CJEU concentrated on the related question whether an award made by 
the arbitral tribunal at hand could at least be subject to review by a judge of a Member 
State enabled to refer the questions of EU law addressed by the tribunal, thereby en-
suring respect of Arts 19 TEU and 267 TFEU. The Court found that such a judicial review 
can be carried out only to the extent that national law allows it and the arbitral tribunal 
is itself to choose its seat and, consequently, the national law applicable to the proce-
dure governing the review process, pursuant to Art. 8, para. 5, BIT. This requirement 
was not completely met in Achmea, since German law provided only for limited judicial 
review.11 Moreover, according to the Court, although the review of the validity of arbi-
tral awards by national judges may legitimately be limited in scope in the context of 
 
6 Ibid., para. 14. 
7 For further insights, see B. DE WITTE, The Impact of Van Gend en Loos on Judicial Protection at Euro-
pean and National Level: Three Types of Preliminary Questions, in A. TIZZANO, J. KOKOTT, S. PRECHAL (dir.), 
50ème anniversaire de l’arrêt Van Gend en Loos, 1963-2013, actes du colloque, Luxembourg, 13 mai 
2013, Luxembourg: Office des publications de l’Union européenne, 2013, p. 93 et seq. 
8 See, inter alia, Court of Justice, opinion 2/13 of 18 December 2014, para. 201, and the case-law cited. 
9 Achmea BV [GC], cit., paras 43-49. 
10 Ibid., paras 39-42. 
11 Ibid., paras 51-53. 
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commercial arbitration (provided that fundamental provisions of EU law may be exam-
ined), the same considerations do not apply to investment arbitration. While the former 
originates in the “freely expressed wishes of the parties”, the latter derives from “a trea-
ty by which Member States agree to remove from the jurisdiction of their own courts, 
and hence from the system of judicial remedies which the second subparagraph of Art. 
19(1) TEU requires them to establish in the fields covered by EU law, disputes which 
may concern the application or interpretation of EU law”.12 
For all these reasons, the CJEU decided that, by stipulating the BIT, Slovakia and the 
Netherlands had created a dispute-settlement mechanism which proved unable to en-
sure the full effectiveness of EU law, although the disputes falling under its competence 
could have concerned the interpretation or application of that law.13 
III. Some of the problems related to the scope and consequences of 
an interpretative preliminary ruling indirectly concerning the 
validity of an agreement between Member States 
This finding raises a number of legal problems, including as regards the scope and con-
sequences of the preliminary ruling procedure under Art. 267 TFEU (in the context of 
the broader and highly sensitive issue relating to the externalization of the judicial pow-
ers derived from the EU Treaties). Here some of them will be sketched, with the aim of 
stimulating further reflections. 
First, it is not entirely clear why arbitral tribunals constituted in accordance with in-
tra-EU BITs should in any case be considered not capable of ensuring the full effective-
ness of EU law. If it is only because they are supposed to be unable to make references 
for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU, since they are not established by law 
(i.e. one of the parameters laid down in well settled case-law of the Court),14 then it may 
be wondered whether this conclusion could be upheld also in respect of arbitral tribu-
nals directly and intentionally set up by Member States through inter se agreements. 
These tribunals draw their jurisdiction from a legal act – like national tribunals – not 
from a contract governed by private law – like contractual arbitration, whose referrals 
for preliminary rulings have traditionally been held inadmissible.15 Moreover, it cannot 
reasonably be excluded that they act as organs common to the States Parties to the 
BIT16 – being entrusted with national judicial functions and issuing decisions simultane-
ously attributable to those States – since they form part of the domestic legal systems 
 
12 Ibid., paras 54-55. 
13 Ibid., para. 56. 
14 See, for instance, Court of Justice, judgment of 6 October 2015, case C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari 
del Maresme [GC], para. 17, and the the case-law cited. 
15 See, inter alia, Court of Justice, judgment of 27 January 2005, case C-125/04, Denuit and Cordenier. 
16 This is also maintained by AG Wathelet, in its Opinion, Achmea BV, cit., para. 85. 
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of those States, by virtue of the internal implementation of the BIT.17 They are inde-
pendent (Art. 8, paras 3-5, BIT) and apply rules of law, including EU law (Art. 8, para. 6, 
BIT). Their jurisdiction is compulsory (Art. 8, paras 1-2, BIT),18 their procedure is inter 
partes and their awards are final and binding upon the parties to the dispute (Art. 8, pa-
ra. 7, BIT).19 Besides, the arbitral tribunal in the main proceedings was called on to rule 
on an infringement of the BIT, which it had to interpret in the light of EU law: as a result, 
it interpreted and applied EU law provisions, especially those on the free movement of 
capital and the right of establishment. 
Second, it seems hard to explain how a State could first conclude (or take over) an 
agreement encompassing an arbitration clause and implement it as a whole and then, 
when a concrete dispute arises, challenge the lawfulness of that clause. The BIT at hand 
in Achmea entered into force at a time when the authority of the CJEU, the preliminary 
ruling procedure and the autonomy of EU law were already in need to be protected. It is 
only the accession of Slovakia to the European Union in 2004 (which transformed the 
Dutch-Slovak BIT into an intra-EU BIT) that may have altered such a background: in the 
event of conflict, the provisions of EU law prevail, in the matters governed by them, over 
the provisions of the BIT. Normally, pursuant to the law of treaties, after having acqui-
esced in the validity of an agreement, by reason of its conduct, a Contracting Party loses 
its right to invoke a ground for invalidating it.20 However, it may be wondered whether 
the supervening intra-EU character of the Dutch-Slovak BIT has any bearing on the ap-
plication of this rule. In this sense, it may be also questioned whether the international 
law norms on the application of successive treaties (on one hand, the 1993 Dutch-
Slovak BIT; on the other, the 2003 Treaty on the accession of Slovakia to the EU and the 
2007 Lisbon Treaty) relating to the same subject-matter could be of some relevance.21 
 
17 In a similar vein to the mixed arbitral tribunals established in accordance with the peace treaties 
that brought World War I to an end: D. ANZILOTTI, Corso di diritto internazionale (introduzione – i soggetti – 
gli organi), Roma: Athenaeum, 1923, p. 163. 
18 As distinct from what provided by other intra-EU BITs, which leave to the investor of one Contract-
ing Party the free choice to decide to whom – among a number of dispute-settlement mechanisms, 
whether arbitral or judicial, national or international – submitting an investment dispute with the other 
Contracting Party. See, for instance, Art. 9 of the 1999 BIT between the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. 
19 In the same sense, as regards investment arbitration tribunals in general, see J. BASEDOW, EU Law 
in International Arbitration: Referrals to the European Court of Justice, in Journal of International Arbitra-
tion, 2015, p. 367 et seq., p. 376 et seq., who considers those tribunals as entitled to request a prelimi-
nary ruling from the CJEU, because they fulfil each and every condition listed by the Court in order to 
identify a “tribunal” for the purposes of Art. 267 TFEU. In particular, the BITs enable the investor to pursue 
its case either in a national court of the host State or in an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. Therefore, such ad hoc 
tribunals are substitutes of the national courts and form part, in that capacity, of the domestic judicial 
system of the respective Member State. 
20 Art. 45 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which, on this point, reflects cus-
tomary international law. 
21 See Arts 30 and 59 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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Third, it is not entirely clear what are the legal consequences of the Achmea judgment 
for the Dutch-Slovak BIT (thus, apart from indirect effects on mixed investment agree-
ments still to be ratified;22 further repercussions on extra-EU BIT’s and free trade agree-
ments between the EU and third countries providing for an investment protection re-
gime;23 judicial implications for pending and future intra-EU investment arbitrations).24 
Can, as a matter of EU law, the declaration of incompatibility contained therein entail the 
invalidity of the Dutch-Slovak BIT (or of the sole arbitration clause, in so far as it is not 
deemed to be essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the BIT)? Can 
the Dutch-Slovak BIT (or the arbitration clause) be considered void and no more in force 
within the EU legal system? How can this be enforced? Usually, it is for the Member State 
whose national law is under scrutiny to amend or repeal that law in order to align it with 
the findings of the CJEU. And, usually, a preliminary ruling stating the invalidity of an 
agreement between the EU and third parties brings about the invalidity of the Council’s 
decision that concluded the agreement on the part of the Union. Quid iuris in respect of 
an inter se agreement between Member States? Has the Achmea judgment a direct im-
pact on the lawfulness and/or the applicability of such agreement within the EU legal or-
der? Alternatively, are the Contracting Parties required under EU law to take the necessary 
and available measures to adjust the agreement consistently or put an end to it? Are they 
merely called upon to do this? Is it only up to the Contracting Parties to determine what 
the Achmea’s implication are?25 What if they fail to take any measure to this end? Is the 
European Commission or a Member State entitled to institute infringement proceedings 
in accordance with Arts 258-260 TFEU and lead the Court to step-in once again? 
 
22 See C. ECKES, Don’t Lead with Your Chin!, cit., who mentions the EU-Canada Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the request to give an opinion on the compatibility with EU law 
of the investor court system it envisages, which was submitted to the CJEU by Belgium, pursuant to Art. 
218, para. 11, TFEU. In the author’s view, the clear indication of incompatibility in Achmea and the EU 
principle of loyalty would compel Member States to suspend the CETA ratification process and wait for 
Court of Justice, Opinion 1/17, which is likely to find the CETA investment chapter to be capable of un-
dermining the autonomy of EU law. 
23 V.D. THYM, The CJEU Ruling in Achmea, cit.; P. NIEMELÄ, Achmea – A Perspective from International 
(Investment) Law, cit.; A. DIMOPOULOS, Achmea, cit.; S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, It is Not Just About Investor-State 
Arbitration, cit. As a matter of principle, probably the arguments put forward in Achmea may be extended 
to the CETA, the EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner-
ship, and the Energy Charter Treaty: see V.D. THYM, The CJEU Ruling in Achmea, cit. 
24 S. HINDELANG, The Limited Immediate Effects of CJEU’s Achmea Judgment, cit.; A. DIMOPOULOS, Ach-
mea, cit.: national courts in Member States would be obliged to set intra-EU BITs provisions conflicting 
with EU law aside and find arbitral awards incompatible with that law in the event these awards are chal-
lenged before them; arbitral tribunals would be obliged to stop pending proceedings and decline their 
jurisdiction over future cases based on intra-EU BITs similar to the Achmea one. For a slightly different 
view, see S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, cit. 
25 As advocated by P. NIEMELÄ, Achmea – A Perspective from International (Investment) Law, cit.; A. 
DIMOPOULOS, Achmea, cit.; S. GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI, It is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration, cit. 
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IV. A few brief concluding remarks 
It is precisely the need to preserve the autonomy of EU law – through its effective and 
uniform application – ensured by the preliminary ruling procedure, along with the need 
to prevent that, by concluding inter se agreements, Member States could derogate from 
their ordinary judiciary and remove disputes on the interpretation and application of EU 
law from the CJEU’s jurisdiction, that might probably lead to a different conclusion: the 
arbitral tribunals provided for in such agreements may be regarded as a “tribunal” with-
in the meaning of Art. 267 TFEU. Indeed, put in these terms, perhaps those tribunals 
should not only be considered as empowered to refer preliminary questions to the 
Court, but also obliged to do so, any time they believe that a decision on questions re-
lating to the interpretation or the validity of EU law is necessary to enable them to settle 
a dispute between an investor and a Member State. In fact, the viability and scope of 
judicial remedies against their arbitral awards (along with the prospect that, in accord-
ance with Arts 19 TEU and 267 TFEU, national judges may be called on to review ex post 
the consistency of those awards with EU law, and make a reference to the Court if need 
be) is contingent upon the specific national law applicable to the procedure concerned, 
which is freely chosen by the arbitral tribunal itself and may considerably vary from 
State to State. The above solution would make sure that any ad hoc arbitral tribunal set 
up on the basis of clauses of intra-EU BITs like the one in Achmea – wherever its seat is 
located and, hence, whichever the national law applicable to the procedure governing 
judicial review of the validity of its awards may be, provided the tribunal is required to 
determine its own procedure applying the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law arbitration rules (which enable it to choose its own venue) – is called to co-
operate with the CJEU pursuant to Art. 267 TFEU and, consequently, ensure the full ef-
fectiveness of EU law. Besides, the Court itself conceives the preliminary ruling proce-
dure as the “keystone” of the judicial system established by the EU Treaties in order to 
preserve the autonomy of EU law.26 
Moreover, perhaps the Achmea judgment is meant to contribute to the present Un-
ion’s agenda aimed at pushing Member States to terminate existing intra-EU BITs to 
which they are parties, since these treaties are likely to undermine the consistent and 
effective application of EU (highly advanced) provisions on the protection of foreign di-
rect investments and related subject-matters within the single market.27 There is ample 
 
26 Achmea BV [GC], cit., para. 37. 
27 On the latest EU policy vis-à-vis international investment treaties and the EU scepticism about in-
vestor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the new 
EU competence over the conclusion of international agreements covering foreign direct investments, see 
C. TITI, International Investment Law and the European Union: Towards a New Generation of International 
Investment Agreements, in European Journal of International Law, 2015, p. 639 et seq.; D. GALLO, F. NICOLA, 
The External Dimension of EU Investment Law: Jurisdictional Clashes and Transformative Adjudication, in 
Fordham International Law Journal, 2016, p. 1081 et seq. 
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evidence of initiatives undertaken by the EU institutions to that purpose, which unfor-
tunately have not fully achieved the expected outcome so far.28 However, one thing is a 
legal and political need, which may be welcomed and supported, another is the tool 
used for pursuing it. It seems that the Court has (once again in its case-law) wished to 
remedy against a European political stalemate.29 In doing so, though, it probably went a 
bit too far, since, in the meanwhile of a tentative political compromise, the arbitration 
clause under its scrutiny could have been considered at least in line with Art. 267 
TFEU,30 under the conditions indicated above. 
 
28 A detail summary is available in F. MUNARI, C. CELLERINO, EU Law is Alive and Healthy, cit., para. 5. 
29 In fact, perhaps the Achmea judgment could furnish the European Commission with a legal argu-
ment to justify a shift from the political measures aimed at convincing Member States to abandon intra-
EU BITs (that it has unsuccessfully taken so far) to more effective judicial measures (under Arts 258 and 
260 TFEU), which could finally compel reluctant Member States. 
30 For a similar view, but on different grounds, see S. HINDELANG, The Limited Immediate Effects of 
CJEU’s Achmea Judgment, cit. 
